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Abstract 
This paper defends Priorianism, a theory in the philosophy of time which combines three 
theses: first, that there is a metaphysical distinction between the present time and non-present 
times; second, that there are temporary propositions, that is, propositions that change in truth-
value simpliciter over time; and third, that there is change over time only if there are 
temporary propositions. Priorianism is accepted by many Presentists, Growing Block 
Theorists, and Moving Spotlight Theorists. However, it is difficult to defend the view without 
appealing to premises that those who reject the view find controversial. My aim in this paper 
is to defend Priorianism in a way that largely avoids appealing to such premises. I do three 
things: first (Section 1), I describe the component theses of Priorianism and the relations 
between them. Next (Section 2), I show how Priorians can respond to the argument that the 
B-theory implies that there are temporary propositions, and therefore satisfies the Priorian 
condition for there being change over time. Finally (Section 3), I defend the Priorian thesis 
that there is change over time only if there are temporary propositions against an alternative 
principle of change defended by Ross Cameron (The Moving Spotlight, 2015). 
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There is an important debate in the philosophy of time between those who accept the theses 
of Temporalism (informally, the view that some propositions change in truth-value 
simpliciter over time) and Temporal Disparity (the view that there is a metaphysical 
distinction between the present time and non-present times), and those who reject them. For 
example, Presentists such as Markosian (2004), Prior (1968), and Rasmussen (2012); 
Growing Blockers such as Forbes (2016) and Forrest (2004); and Moving Spotlighters such as 
Cameron (2015) accept both Temporalism and Temporal Disparity, whereas B-theorists such 
as Quine (1960), Mellor (1998) and Sider (2001) seem to reject them.1 Moreover, following 
Prior (1968), many of those who accept both Temporalism and Temporal Disparity also 
accept the view that I call Priorian Change, according to which the truth of Temporalism is a 
necessary condition for there being change over time. I call such philosophers Priorians.  
In this paper, I provide a limited defence of Priorianism. I call it a ‘limited’ defence 
for two reasons: first, because my focus in what follows is on defending Temporalism and 
Priorian Change rather than Temporal Disparity. There are two reason for this: first, as we 
shall see below in §1, Priorians disagree amongst themselves as to what exactly it is that 
metaphysically distinguishes the present time from non-present times. This makes it difficult 
to provide a unified treatment of Temporal Disparity. Second, many of those who accept 
Temporal Disparity accept it on the grounds that our experience tells us that there is a 
fundamental distinction between present and non-present events, and therefore a fundamental 
distinction between the present time and non-present times.2 It would be impossible to do 
justice to such ‘arguments from experience’ for Temporal Disparity here: they deserve a 
                                               
1 I don’t claim that all of these works contain explicit defences of the relevant theses, but rather that the views 
they defend can reasonably be interpreted as views on which the relevant theses are true.  
2 Skow (2015, Chapters 11 and 12) describes a number of ‘arguments from experience’ for the conclusion that 
the present time is metaphysically privileged. See also Spolaore & Torrengo (2019) for the development and 
rejection of such an argument.  
 3 
dedicated discussion.  
The second reason I call my defence ‘limited’ is because I do not attempt to provide 
original arguments in favour of Temporalism and Priorian Change. The reason is that most 
philosophers who accept those theses accept them on grounds that are not very compelling to 
those who already reject them. In particular, many of those who accept Temporalism simply 
accept it on the basis of its instances:3 for example, given that I was standing half an hour ago 
and am now sitting, the proposition that I am sitting is sometimes but not always true. But of 
course, those who reject Temporalism will argue that its alleged instances are not really 
instances at all. And those who accept Priorian Change typically accept it is a basic principle: 
they simply hold that if the facts never change, nothing changes.4  
So, rather than attempting to provide original arguments in favour of Temporalism 
and Priorian Change, I do three things: first (§1), I carefully describe Temporalism, Temporal 
Disparity, and Priorian Change. My aim here is to advance the dialectic between Priorians 
and their opponents by (i) setting out the three Priorian theses in clear and (relatively) 
unambiguous terms, and (ii) describing some of the important connections between them. 
Next (§2), I defend the Priorian argument that given that the B-theory implies the falsehood 
of Temporalism, the B-theory implies (given Priorian Change) that nothing ever changes. I 
do this by showing how Priorians can respond to the argument that the B-theory is, in fact, a 
Temporalist view. It is important to note that my aim in this section is not to convince 
committed B-theorists that their view implies that nothing ever changes. Rather, my aim is to 
describe what I take to be the best available Priorian response to the argument that the B-
theory implies Temporalism. As above, this serves to advance the dialectic between Priorians 
and their (B-theoretic) opponents. However, it also contributes to a defence of Priorianism: a 
                                               
3 This seems to be the case for Prior (1968, 11), for example. 
4 Again, see Prior (1968, 9).  
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central motivation for many Priorians is to defend a ‘dynamic’ theory of time and change, in 
contrast to the B-theorist’s ‘static’ theory of time and change. If the B-theory turned out to be 
as ‘dynamic’ as Priorianism, this particular motivation would be lost. I show how Priorians 
can try to maintain their claim that in contrast to the B-theory, their view is one on which 
there is ‘dynamic’ change.5 Finally (§3), I defend Priorian Change. As mentioned above, I do 
not do so by providing an original argument in favour of the view. Rather, I argue against a 
recent alternative to Priorian Change arising from Ross Cameron’s (2015) influential defence 
of (a version of) the Moving Spotlight Theory (MST). In particular, I argue that Cameron’s 
reliance on a stronger alternative to Priorian Change leads to serious difficulties for his own 
view; difficulties that can be avoided by an acceptance of Priorian Change. I also argue that 
given an acceptance of Priorian Change, Cameron can argue that Deasy’s (2015) rival version 
of MST is (unlike Cameron’s MST) a view according to which nothing ever changes.   
 
1. Priorianism 
I begin by describing Priorianism. As mentioned above, at the heart of the view are two theses: 
Temporalism and Temporal Disparity. Let us consider each in turn. First, Temporalism: 
 
Temporalism: For some p, sometimes p and sometimes not-p 
(∃p(Sp ⋀ S¬p)) 
 
Temporalism can be understood informally as the thesis that there are temporary propositions: 
that is, propositions that are sometimes true and sometimes false. An example of a temporary 
proposition is <I am sitting>6 – it is true now, but it was false a few minutes ago when I was 
                                               
5 As an anonymous referee pointed out to me, some philosophers have argued that Priorian views fail to secure 
‘dynamic’ change: see e.g. Deng (2013); Fine (2005); Leininger (2015); Lipman (2018); and Skow (2015). 
Unfortunately, limitations of space mean that it is not possible to consider these arguments here. 
6 Read ‘<𝜑>’ as ‘the proposition that 𝜑’.  
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making tea. In contrast, <I am sitting at u> (where ‘u’ names this time) is plausibly a permanent 
proposition: given that it is true, it is always true, and if it were false, it would always be false.7 
After all, if I am sitting at this time then for any time t, at t, I am sitting at this time – just as, 
given that there are Beefeaters in London, wherever one is, there are Beefeaters in London.8,9  
 It is important to note that Temporalism is consistent with the view that there are no 
such things as propositions, despite the informal gloss on the thesis provided above. In 
particular, Prior (1971, Chapter 3) argues that languages containing higher-order 
quantification – e.g. quantification into predicate or sentence position – can be understood 
otherwise than by translation into languages that do not, and therefore that higher-order 
quantification need not be interpreted as equivalent to e.g. first-order ‘objectual’ 
quantification over abstracta such as (monadic or polyadic) properties or propositions.10 In 
that case, Temporalism can be interpreted as involving irreducibly higher-order 
quantification, rather than implicit first-order quantification over propositions.11 Let us call 
Temporalism interpreted as involving irreducibly higher-order quantification Sentential 
Temporalism. We can then distinguish Sentential Temporalism – acceptance of which is 
consistent with the view that there are (quantifying at the first-order) no propositions – from 
Propositional Temporalism, the view that there are (quantifying at the first-order) 
                                               
7 The claim here is not that every ‘time-specific’ proposition (i.e. every proposition about a particular time) is 
permanent. For example, Barlassina & Del Prete (2015) argue that <Lance Armstrong won the Tour de France 
in 2000> has changed in truth-value over the past two decades, and is therefore a temporary proposition.  
8 Some philosophers posit a second ‘time-like’ dimension – call it hypertime – and allow that time-specific 
propositions such as <I am sitting at u> can have different truth-values relative to different hypertimes (even if 
they have the same truth-value relative to every time). Such propositions would be permanent but also 
hypertemporary. (Thank you to an anonymous referee for drawing my attention to this point.) 
9 The distinction between temporary and permanent propositions does not map exactly onto the distinction 
between ‘tensed’ and ‘tenseless’ sentences. For example, whereas the tensed sentence ‘It is raining in New 
York’ may be taken to express a temporary proposition, the tensed sentence ‘It is now raining in New York’ 
plausibly expresses a permanent proposition (given the standard tense-logical principle that what is now the case 
is always now the case). (Thank you to an anonymous referee for drawing my attention to this point.) 
10 As well as Prior (1971, Chapter 3), see e.g. Bostock (2004); Frege (1879); Dorr (2016, §4); Jones (2018; 
2019); Rayo & Yablo (2001); and Williamson (2003). 
11 Or, indeed, as involving implicit first-order quantification over linguistic entities such as predicates or 
sentences, as on the ‘substitutional’ interpretation of higher-order quantifiers. See e.g. Marcus (1961) for an 
introduction to substitutional quantification.  
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propositions that are sometimes true and sometimes false: 
 
Propositional Temporalism: For some x, x is a proposition, and sometimes x is true, 
and sometimes x is false 
(∃x(Proposition(x) ⋀ STrue(x) ⋀ S¬True(x))) 
 
In this paper, I sometimes speak about Temporalism as if it is equivalent to Propositional 
Temporalism, as it is difficult to express Temporalism in ordinary language without resorting 
to talk of propositions – as Prior (1971, 37) notes, ‘forms like “For some p, p” are not 
idiomatic English, perhaps not even idiomatic Indo-European’. However, bear in mind as 
mentioned above that this is merely an informal presentation of the thesis: I intend to remain 
officially neutral on the question of whether Temporalism should be interpreted as equivalent 
to Sentential Temporalism or Propositional Temporalism. (As we shall see in §2 below, the 
difference between the two interpretations matters.) 
 Next, we turn to Temporal Disparity: 
 
Temporal Disparity: There is a metaphysical distinction between the present time and 
non-present times 
 
Temporal Disparity can be thought of as a thesis concerning this time u: namely, that u’s 
being present metaphysically distinguishes it from every other time. Temporal Disparity does 
not imply that the property of being present is a metaphysically fundamental property: there 
is disagreement among those who accept Temporal Disparity as to what metaphysically 
distinguishes u from every other time. For example, some Presentists (according to whom 
everything is present) hold that there is exactly one time (although which time there is 
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changes), and therefore the metaphysical specialness of u consists in nothing more than its 
being something. Other Presentists hold that there are past, present, and future times, where 
times are instant-propositions: maximal, consistent, sometime-true propositions.12 On this 
view, the metaphysical specialness of u consists in its being the true time (all other times are 
false, but were or will be true). Growing Blockers (according to whom only the past and 
present are real) typically hold that the metaphysical specialness of u consists in its being the 
time than which there is no later: informally, ‘the leading edge of the growing block’.13 And 
Moving Spotlighters (according to whom the past, present and future are all real) typically 
hold that the metaphysical specialness of u consists in its possessing the fundamental 
property of presentness: informally, being ‘the time on which the spotlight of presentness 
shines’.14 
Temporalism and Temporal Disparity form a natural package: in particular, many of 
those who defend Temporal Disparity also defend Temporalism, and vice versa.15 Indeed, 
Priorians can argue that Temporal Disparity implies and is implied by Temporalism. For 
example, suppose one holds that there is some metaphysically special property G possessed 
by this time u in virtue of which u is present (for example, G might be the property of being 
true, or being the leading edge of the growing block). In that case, Priorians can argue that 
unless one holds that <u is G> is temporary, it is always the case that this time is present, and 
therefore in that sense presentness is ‘stuck’ at this time. In the other direction, suppose that 
                                               
12 See e.g. Markosian (2004), Prior (1968), and Rasmussen (2012).  
13 See e.g. Forbes (2016) and Forrest (2004).  
14 Deasy (2015) defends this sort of ‘traditional’ Moving Spotlight Theory; Cameron (2015) does not. Rather, 
according to Cameron, this time u is present in virtue of being the unique time t such that for all x, x’s age at t is 
x’s age simpliciter (where ages are fundamental temporary properties of objects).  
15 There are exceptions, however. In particular, although he ultimately rejects the view, Skow’s (2015, §4.3) 
‘MST-Time’ combines Temporal Disparity with an apparent rejection of Temporalism. Skow (ibid, 67) writes: 
‘When I introduced MST-Supertime I discussed the objection that MST-Supertime does not contain objective 
becoming because in it time does not undergo robust change. The same objection could be made against MST-
Time.’ Given that for Skow, a theory T implies that time ‘undergoes robust change’ just in case T implies 
Temporalism, this seems to be an admission by Skow that MST-Time does not imply Temporalism. Similarly, 
Deasy (2015) defends a version of the Moving Spotlight Theory that implies Temporal Disparity but does not 
clearly imply Temporalism (see §3 below).  
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Temporalism is true. In that case, Priorians can argue there must be a unique time t such that 
for any p, p is true at t iff p is true simpliciter – informally, a unique time at which truth 
simpliciter and truth-at-a-time ‘line up’. Call such a time accurate.16 Plausibly, if there is a 
unique accurate time t, t is the present time. But in that case, given that accuracy is a 
metaphysically special property, there is a metaphysical distinction between the present time 
and non-present times.17  
Priorians combine Temporalism and Temporal Disparity with the view that the truth 
of Temporalism is a necessary condition for there being change over time. For example, here 
is Prior (1968, 9): 
 
To say that a change has occurred is to say at least this much: that something which was the case 
formerly is not the case now. That is, it is at least to say that for some sentence p we have ‘It was the 
case that p, and it is not the case that p’.18 
 
According to Prior, a change has occurred only if for some p, it was the case that p and it is 
not the case that p (∃p(Pp ⋀ ¬p)). Generalising, we can say that change sometimes occurs – 
i.e. there is change over time – only if for some p, it is sometimes the case that p and 
sometimes the case that not-p, i.e. only if Temporalism is true. Call this thesis Priorian 
Change: 
 
                                               
16 Following Dorr (Counterparts MS). 
17 Opponents of Priorianism may respond here by arguing that the fact that there are temporary propositions – 
conceived by them as propositions that bear the (permanent) true-at relation to some but not all times – does not 
imply that there is an accurate time. Whether this response is successful turns on the important question of what 
exactly it is for a proposition to be ‘temporary’. I return to this important question in §2 below.  
18 Prior’s use of the expression ‘for some sentence p’ here is, I think, an unfortunate slip, as it gives the 
unhelpful impression that for Prior, Temporalism is to be interpreted as involving first-order quantification over 
sentences rather than higher-order quantification into sentence position. However, that would be very surprising 
given Prior’s clear commitment to irreducibly higher-order quantification: see especially Prior (1971, Chapter 
3).  
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Priorian Change: There is change over time only if Temporalism is true 
 
Why accept Priorian Change? As mentioned above in §0, it is not clear that there are any 
non-question-begging arguments for the view, in the sense of arguments whose premises are 
likely to be accepted by those who already reject it. Those such as Prior who accept it simply 
judge that things change only if the facts change; or better yet, that things change only if 
reality changes. Priorian Change expresses this basic judgement. Finally, given that there is 
change over time, Priorian Change implies Temporalism; and as we saw above, according to 
Priorians, Temporalism implies Temporal Disparity. It follows that for Priorians, it is enough 
to be a Priorian to accept Priorian Change.  
 
2. Temporalism and the B-theory 
Unlike Presentists, Growing Block Theorists, and Moving Spotlighters, B-theorists –
according to whom ‘time is a dimension just like the three spatial dimensions’, ‘presentness 
is merely relative’, and ‘change is mere variation across time’ – appear to reject Temporalism 
and Temporal Disparity in favour of Atemporalism and Temporal Parity: 
 
Atemporalism: For any p, if p then always p 
(∀p(p → Ap)) 
 
Temporal Parity: There is no metaphysical distinction between the present time and 
non-present times 
 
For Priorians, the fact (if it is a fact) that the B-theory implies Atemporalism provides an 
obvious reason to reject the view: given Priorian Change, it follows that given the B-theory, 
 10 
nothing ever changes, and therefore reality is ‘static’. But of course, things do change; 
therefore, the B-theory is false. In other words, Priorians can argue against the B-theory as 
follows: 
 
(1) There is change over time only if Temporalism is true (Priorian Change) 
 
(2) If the B-theory is true then Temporalism is false 
  




 (c) The B-theory is false 
 
Of course, there are other ways in which Priorians can argue against the B-theory. For 
example, they can argue that given that there is a metaphysical distinction between the 
present time and non-present times, the B-theory is false. And Presentist Priorians can argue 
that given that the B-theory implies that there are (quantifying unrestrictedly) wholly non-
present things such as dodos, the B-theory is false.19 However, my interest here is in the 
argument against the B-theory from Priorian Change, for two reasons: first, it is a matter of 
controversy whether that argument is successful, and in particular, whether premise (2) above 
is true. Therefore, there is (I think) greater philosophical interest in discussing that argument. 
Second, we saw above in §1 that from the Priorian perspective, Priorian Change plausibly 
                                               
19 See e.g. Zimmerman (2008, 221), who writes: ‘My reason for believing the A-theory is utterly banal[…]: it is 
simply part of commonsense that the past and future are less real than the present.’ 
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implies both Temporalism and Temporal Disparity. It follows that unlike the other arguments 
against the B-theory just mentioned, the argument from Priorian Change is one that (from a 
Priorian perspective) cannot be made by non-Priorians. 
How would B-theorists respond to the argument from Priorian Change? Some B-
theorists may reject premise (1) – i.e. Priorian Change – on the grounds that change over time 
consists in nothing more than (permanent) variation along the temporal dimension, which is 
consistent with the truth of Atemporalism. But for Priorians, the identification of change with 
(permanent) variation along the temporal dimension is like the identification of contingency 
with (necessary) variation between maximal interrelated spatiotemporal systems – it is simply 
a misidentification of one sort of phenomenon with another. 
 What about premise (2) – is it really the case that the B-theory implies Atemporalism? 
Some B-theorists may reject premise (2) on the grounds that, in fact, their view implies 
Temporalism. For example, a B-theorist could argue as follows: propositions are really just 
properties of times, so that e.g. <there are dinosaurs> is just the property G such that for any 
time t, G(t) just in case there are dinosaurs located at t. On this view, a permanent proposition 
is a proposition that is ‘true-at’ – i.e. possessed by – either every time or no times, and a 
temporary proposition is a proposition that is true-at some but not all times. In that case, the 
B-theory implies that there are temporary propositions – e.g. <there are dinosaurs> is true-at 
some but not all times – and therefore given the B-theory, Temporalism (in the form of 
Propositional Temporalism) is true. It follows that premise (2) of the argument from Priorian 
Change against the B-theory is false.  
 As mentioned in §0 above, if this argument is successful, it undercuts one of the 
primary motivations for Priorianism: to defend a ‘dynamic’ view of time in contrast to the 
‘static’ B-theory. For if the B-theory implies Temporalism, then given Priorian Change, the 
B-theory is (from a Priorian perspective) just as much a theory according to which things 
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really change as Priorianism is. So, how might Priorians respond to the above argument?  
There are two ways for Priorians to resist the claim that the B-theory implies 
Temporalism. They rely on the important distinction drawn in §1 above between the two 
different ways in which Temporalism can be interpreted: either as involving irreducibly 
higher-order quantification into sentence position (i.e. as Sentential Temporalism), or as 
involving first-order ‘objectual’ quantification over propositions (i.e. as Propositional 
Temporalism). Let us consider each in turn. 
First, suppose that Priorians identify Temporalism with Sentential Temporalism. The 
question then becomes: does the B-theory imply Sentential Temporalism? Now, the first 
point to note in answering this question is that B-theorists accept the reduction of the standard 
tense operators (‘It was the case that’, ‘It will be the case that’, etc.) to quantifiers over times. 
So, for example, according to the B-theory, a sentence of the form ‘It was the case that 𝜑’ 
reduces to ‘There is a time t earlier than this time u such that at t, 𝜑’; and a sentence of the 
form ‘Sometimes, 𝜑’ reduces to ‘There is a time t such that at t, 𝜑’. Given that Sentential 
Temporalism is expressed above using the standard tense operator ‘Sometimes’, it follows 
that given the B-theory, Sentential Temporalism reduces to: 
 
(4) There is a p such that for some time t, at t, p, and for some time t, at t, not-p 
(∃p(∃t at t(p) ⋀ ∃t at t(¬p))) 
 
But (4) is false given the B-theory. In order to see this, we need to pay attention to another 
element of the B-theoretic reduction of the tense operators.  
As we saw above, B-theorists analyse sentences of the form e.g. ‘It was the case that 
𝜑’ as ‘There is a time t earlier than this time u such that at t, 𝜑’. But this is not the end of the 
story: for the sentence ‘There is a time t earlier than this time u such that at t, 𝜑’ still contains 
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a kind of tense operator, namely, the expression ‘at (time) t’. And in addition to providing an 
analysis of the standard tense operators, B-theorists also defend an analysis of ‘at t’. In 
particular, according to the B-theory, the function of ‘at t’ is to relativise predicates to times 
by binding unvoiced time-variables in the predicates in its scope. So, for example, according 
to the B-theory ‘At t, there are dinosaurs’ reduces to ‘There are dinosaurs located at t’, and 
‘At t, Jones is dancing’ reduces to ‘Jones bears the (permanent) dancing-at relation to t’ 
(which may then be further analysed depending on which theory of persistence is accepted).20  
Given the standard B-theoretic analysis of ‘at t’ just described, (4) is false according 
to the B-theory. The reason is that (4) is (by stipulation) a sentence of an irreducibly higher-
order language, and as such, there are no predicates in the scope of the instances of ‘at t’ in 
(4): there is only the (irreducibly) higher-order variable ‘p’. Therefore, there are no predicates 
with unvoiced time-variables for the instances of ‘at t’ in (4) to bind, in which case the 
instances of ‘at t’ in (4) are redundant. But if the instances of ‘at t’ in (4) are redundant, then 
(4) is equivalent to the higher-order logical falsehood ‘There is a p such that p and not-p’ 
(‘∃p(p ⋀	¬p’)). Therefore (4) – i.e. Sentential Temporalism – is false according to the B-
theory. Moreover, it follows that the sentence  
 
(5) There is no p such that sometimes p and sometimes not-p 
(¬∃p(Sp ⋀ S¬p)) 
 
is (logically) true according to the B-theory. But (5) is equivalent to Sentential Atemporalism, 
i.e. Atemporalism read as involving irreducibly higher-order quantification. In short, if 
Temporalism is identified with Sentential Temporalism, then the B-theory implies Sentential 
                                               
20 For example, according to some B-theorists, for someone to bear the dancing-at relation to a time t is for them 
to have an ‘instantaneous temporal part’ located at t that is dancing (simpliciter). See e.g. Sider (2001).  
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Atemporalism.  
 We have looked at one way for Priorians to resist the claim that the B-theory implies 
Temporalism: that is, to interpret Temporalism as equivalent to Sentential Temporalism, i.e. 
as involving irreducibly higher-order quantification. Priorians may argue that the relative 
simplicity of this strategy speaks in its favour. Moreover, as mentioned above in §1, Prior 
himself was a significant defender of the intelligibility of irreducibly higher-order 
quantification.21 For example, here is Prior (1971, 36): 
 
All this can be carried over, mutatis mutandis, into the discussion of quantifications over variables of 
other categories, and there isn’t the least need to equate them with name variables in order to see what 
is going on. ‘For some φ, Peter φ’s’ is true if any specification of it is true, meaning by a ‘specification’ 
of it any statement in which the indefinite verb ‘does something’ or ‘acts somehow’ is replaced by 
some specific verb or equivalent expression, e.g. ‘is red-haired’; and it is of course true if and only if, 
for some φ, Peter φ’s. It hasn’t any quite exact colloquial expression in English, because such variable 
verbs as ‘do’ tend to stand only for verbs of a particular sort – ‘Peter is red-haired’ would not be 
thought of as a natural specification of ‘Peter does something’. ‘Peter is or does something’ would 
perhaps catch the full generality of ‘For some φ, Peter φ’s’ well enough, and the way it works is 
clear…. In all this I cannot see anything mysterious, or anything that need compel us to treat variables 
that do not stand for names of objects as if they did.  
 
However, some B-theorists may question the intelligibility of irreducibly higher-order 
languages. As mentioned above in §1, natural languages such as English do not seem to 
provide us with the relevant conceptual resources: natural language quantification is almost 
invariably objectual (i.e. involves quantification over things). So how can we ever come to 
understand irreducibly higher-order languages? According to Williamson (2013, 459), such 
                                               
21 See also Bostock (2004); Dorr (2016, §4); Frege (1879); Jones (2018; 2019); Rayo & Yablo (2001); and 
Williamson (2003). 
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languages must be learnt ‘by the direct method’: 
 
Perhaps no reading in a natural language of quantification into predicate position is wholly satisfactory. 
If so, that does not show that something is wrong with quantification into predicate position, for it may 
reflect an expressive inadequacy in natural languages. We may have to learn second-order languages 
by the direct method, not by translating them into a language with which we are already familiar. At 
some point, we learn to understand [certain] symbols directly; why not use the same method for ∀F? 
We must learn to use higher-order languages as our home language.  
 
B-theorists may also object that the argument that the B-theory implies the falsehood of 
Temporalism because it implies the falsehood of Sentential Temporalism in some sense 
confuses logic with metaphysics; that it involves ‘pulling a metaphysical rabbit out of a 
logical hat’. Priorian friends of irreducibly higher-order quantification can respond to this 
objection by arguing that insofar as we treat irreducibly higher-order quantification as 
primitive and accept the Lewisian view that the unanalysed expressions in which we couch 
our theories in some sense reflect the fundamental structure of reality22 – i.e. ‘carve reality at 
its joints’ – a commitment to irreducibly higher-order quantification reflects not just a 
commitment to a certain choice of logic, but to a certain theory of fundamental reality (i.e. as 
having fundamental higher-order structure). 
Finally, B-theorists may object that the argument that the B-theory implies the 
falsehood of Temporalism because it implies the falsehood of Sentential Temporalism ‘loads 
the dice’ against the B-theory by shifting the debate to less favourable ground for B-theorists. 
After all, as we saw at the top of this section, the most natural B-theoretic interpretation of 
Temporalism on which that thesis is true given the B-theory is one according to which 
Temporalism is equivalent to Propositional Temporalism. Let us therefore consider another 
                                               
22 See especially Lewis (1983) and Sider (2011). Note that both Lewis and Sider are B-theorists.    
 16 
way for Priorians to resist the claim that the B-theory implies Temporalism. This strategy 
involves agreeing with B-theorists that Temporalism ought to be identified with Propositional 
Temporalism, but then arguing that Propositional Temporalism ought to be interpreted as 
involving a monadic, rather than a dyadic, truth property. 
To see how this strategy works, we need to carefully unpack the B-theorist’s proposed 
interpretation of Temporalism described above. In arguing that their view implies 
Temporalism, B-theorists begin by identifying Temporalism with Propositional Temporalism. 
They then apply the standard B-theoretic analysis of ‘Sometimes, 𝜑’ (as ‘There is a time t 
such that at t, 𝜑’) to Propositional Temporalism to get: 
 
(6) For some x, x is a proposition and at some time t, x is true, and at some time t, x is 
false  
(∃x(Proposition(x) ⋀ ∃t at t(True(x)) ⋀ ∃t at t(¬True(x)))) 
 
Next, the standard B-theoretic analysis of the tense operator ‘at (time) t’ – on which the 
function of ‘at t’ is to bind unvoiced time-variables in the predicates in its scope – is applied 
to (6), to get: 
 
(7) For some x, x is a proposition and there is a time t such that x is true-at t, and a 
time t such that x is not true-at t  
 (∃x(Proposition(x) ⋀ ∃t True(x, t) ⋀ ∃t ¬True(x, t))) 
 
Propositions are then identified with properties of times, and the two-place true-at relation 
between propositions and times in (7) is analysed in terms of the (permanent) instantiation 
relation, so that for a proposition p to be true-at a time t is just for p to be instantiated by t.  
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Thus, we see that in order to provide an interpretation of Propositional Temporalism 
on which it is true according to the B-theory, B-theorists must interpret the truth-predicate in 
the statement of Propositional Temporalism as expressing a dyadic property – i.e. the 
(permanent) true-at relation between propositions and times. It follows that Priorians can 
resist the conclusion that the B-theory implies Propositional Temporalism by arguing that the 
truth predicate in the statement of Propositional Temporalism ought to be interpreted as 
expressing the (temporary) monadic property of truth simpliciter. For if the instances of the 
predicate ‘is true’ in (6) express a monadic property then they do not contain unvoiced time-
variables, in which case there is nothing for the instances of ‘at t’ in (6) to operate on. But if 
there is nothing for the instances of ‘at t’ in (6) to operate on, they are redundant. It follows 
that given the B-theory, (6) is equivalent to the (first-order) logical falsehood ‘There is an x 
such that x is a proposition and x is both true and false’ (‘∃x(Proposition(x) ⋀ True(x) ⋀ 
¬True(x))’). Therefore (6) – i.e. Propositional Temporalism – is false according to the B-
theory. Moreover, it follows that the sentence  
 
(8) There is no x such that x is a proposition, and sometimes x is true, and sometimes x 
is false 
(¬∃x(Proposition(x) ⋀ STrue(x) ⋀ S¬True(x))) 
 
is (logically) true according to the B-theory. But (8) is equivalent to Propositional 
Atemporalism, i.e. Atemporalism read as involving first-order quantification over 
propositions. In short, if Temporalism is identified with the view that some propositions 
change in truth-value simpliciter over time, then the B-theory implies Propositional 
Atemporalism. 
 We have looked at a second way for Priorians to resist the claim that the B-theory 
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implies Temporalism; one which does not rely on an appeal to irreducibly higher-order 
languages, and which agrees with B-theorists that Temporalism ought to be identified with 
Propositional Temporalism. B-theorists may respond to this strategy by arguing that to 
interpret the truth-predicate in Propositional Temporalism as expressing the property of truth 
simpliciter simply ‘begs the question’ against their view: of course (they may say) the B-
theory implies the falsehood of Propositional Temporalism when that thesis is interpreted as 
involving monadic truth rather than the true-at relation between propositions and times.  
However, Priorians can respond that the charge of ‘begging the question’ carries 
limited force in this case. In particular, Priorians can argue that the idea that propositions are 
true or false simpliciter – and not merely relatively true or false – has strong intuitive force 
irrespective of one’s views on the metaphysics of time.23 Some B-theorists who accept that 
Temporalism (in the form of Propositional Temporalism) is a necessary condition for there 
being change over time may feel the pull of monadic truth. And even those who do not feel 
that pull may yet acknowledge that the arguments for and against monadic truth are at least 
less question-begging than e.g. the Priorian arguments for rejecting the B-theoretic account of 
change as ‘variation along the temporal dimension’.24  
B-theorists may respond here that a commitment to the view that there are ‘temporary 
propositions’ in the sense of propositions that are true-at some but not all times does not 
preclude a commitment to there being a monadic property of propositions of truth simpliciter. 
For example, they can argue that there is a difference between propositions as the contents of 
the propositional attitudes such as belief and desire, which are often ‘temporary’ in the sense 
of being true-at some but not all times, and propositions as the primary bearers of truth 
                                               
23 Note that a commitment to the view that propositions are true/false simpliciter does not preclude holding that 
some propositions are also true/false relative to times. For example, Priorians who identify times with maximal, 
consistent, sometimes-true propositions will naturally hold that for any p, p is true-at a time t just in case t 
implies p. It follows that for any p, p is true simpliciter just in case p is true-at the present (i.e. true) time. The 
key point here is that for such Priorians, truth-at is analysed in terms of truth simpliciter. 
24 See especially Cappelen & Hawthorne (2009) for arguments concerning monadic truth. 
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values, which are if true always true (simpliciter). Something like this strategy is defended by 
e.g. Sider (2001, 20-21), who refers to propositions of the first kind as ‘temporal 
propositions’. This strategy incurs some obvious costs, however: first, of splitting the 
‘proposition’ role between propositions of the first sort and propositions of the second; and 
second, of implying that the way that we represent reality in thought (as temporal) is not the 
way that reality actually is (i.e. atemporal).  
B-theorists may also object that by insisting on interpreting the truth predicate in 
Propositional Temporalism as expressing the temporary monadic property of truth 
simpliciter, Priorians are simply baking their own notion of change into Temporalism, and 
therefore (again) ‘begging the question’ against the B-theory (according to which change 
consists in variation along the temporal dimension). This would be particularly problematic, 
since premise (1) of the Priorian argument against the B-theory is Priorian Change, which 
states that Temporalism is a necessary condition for there being change over time.  
As above, however, Priorians should respond to this objection by pointing out that the 
idea that propositions change in truth value simpliciter has intuitive force independent of 
one’s views on the metaphysics of time, and in particular on the nature of change. A natural 
way for Priorians to defend this claim is by analogy. Suppose that according to the B-theory, 
<Jones is dancing at u> (where u names this time) is (permanently) true simpliciter. Most B-
theorists will also accept that that proposition is contingently true: Jones could have failed to 
dance at u. In other words, most B-theorists will accept that <Jones is dancing at u> is true 
simpliciter but could have been false simpliciter; and more generally, that contingency 
involves possible variation in properties simpliciter (rather than variation in properties 
relative to worlds, or variation in properties simpliciter between otherworldly counterparts – 
see e.g. Lewis 1968). Priorians can argue that this natural view of contingency also applies to 
the temporal case.  
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 We have seen that Priorians can defend their claim that the B-theory is true only if 
Temporalism is false (which is a key premise of their argument from Priorian Change against 
the B-theory) either by identifying Temporalism with Sentential Temporalism or by 
identifying Temporalism with Propositional Temporalism and arguing that the truth predicate 
in the statement of Propositional Temporalism ought to be interpreted as expressing a 
monadic property. We have also seen that neither strategy is likely to convince a committed 
B-theorist that their view is one according to which nothing ever changes. In particular, I do 
not claim that Priorians can entirely avoid the accusation of in some sense ‘begging the 
question’ against the B-theory in marshalling the argument from Priorian Change. But my 
aim in this section has not been to describe a version of the argument from Priorian Change 
against the B-theory that cannot be charged with ‘begging the question’. Rather, as 
mentioned in §0 above, my aim has been to describe what I take to be the best available 
Priorian response to the argument that the B-theory implies Temporalism.  
 
3. Cameronian Change 
In the previous section I defended Priorianism by defending the argument from Priorian 
Change against the B-theory. In this section I defend Priorianism by defending Priorian 
Change. I do so indirectly, by arguing against an alternative necessary condition for there 
being change over time due to Cameron (2015). As we shall see, Cameron does not state his 
alternative to Priorian Change explicitly: rather, his commitment to the principle emerges in 
the course of his defence of (a version of) the Moving Spotlight Theory (MST). Therefore, it 
is necessary to describe Cameron’s version of MST, and what he takes to be its main rival, 
before we can properly consider his alternative to Priorian Change.  
Cameron (2015) defends a non-standard version of MST that combines three core 
theses: first, that the past and future are concrete parts of reality; second, that every individual 
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possesses a temporary fundamental age property (where for all x, x’s age is the amount of 
time that has passed since x began to occupy spacetime); and third, that every individual 
possesses a permanent fundamental temporal distribution property (i.e. a fundamental 
property of having a certain cross-time qualitative profile). As Cameron’s theory is 
essentially a version of MST where the temporary fundamental ‘spotlight’ of presentness is 
replaced with the temporary fundamental ‘ages’ of occupants of spacetime, let us call 
Cameron’s view the Moving Ages Theory (MAT). 
Cameron argues that it is an advantage of MAT that, unlike standard versions of 
MST, it ‘avoids having to take any tensed fact as fundamental’ (ibid, 127), and therefore 
implies the truth of Anti-tensism: 
 
Anti-tensism: There are no fundamental tense-logical operators (i.e. sentence 
operators such as ‘It was the case that’ (‘P’), ‘It will be the case that’ (‘F’), and ‘It is 
the case at time t that’ (‘At (time) t’)) 
 
However, Cameron’s acceptance of Anti-tensism is not based on an acceptance of reductive 
analyses of the standard tense operators.25 Rather, according to Cameron, the goal of theories 
of time should be to provide ‘tenseless’ – i.e. tense operator-free – truthmakers for true 
‘tensed’ propositions, where a proposition p is a truthmaker for a proposition q just in case 
‘p’s being the case explains, in more fundamental terms, why q is the case’ (Cameron ibid, 
114). We can get a feel for Cameron’s ‘tenseless truthmakers for tensed truths’ via some 
examples. For instance, on Cameron’s view, <there used to be dinosaurs> is made true by the 
truth of <the state of affairs of there being dinosaurs located at a time earlier than the present 
time exists>; and <I will be entirely grey-haired> is made true by the truth of <the state of 
                                               
25 Or, indeed, on the rejection of ‘standard realism’ á la Fine’s (2005) fragmentalism. See especially Lipman 
(2015) for a careful discussion of Fine’s view.  
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affairs of my having a certain age, temporal distributional property, and spatiotemporal 
location exists>. 
As Cameron (ibid, 77ff) points out, however, he faces a problem: the arguments he 
uses to motivate MAT also motivate an apparently simpler version of MST inspired by 
Bricker’s (2006) theory of modality. Let us call this view Bricker’s Spotlight Theory (BST). 
BST differs from MAT in two important respects. First, whereas according to MAT there are 
many temporary fundamental properties – i.e. the temporary fundamental ages of occupants 
of spacetime – according to BST, there is exactly one temporary fundamental property: the 
temporary fundamental property of presentness possessed by this time.26 Second, whereas 
according to MAT propositions concerning change in which time is present (such as <1966 
was but is no longer present>) are ultimately grounded in the existence of states of affairs of 
things having certain ages, according to BST, such propositions reduce to propositions 
concerning temporal relations between times and a present time, as follows: 
 
For any time t, t was present just in case t is earlier than a present time 
(∀t(P(Present(t)) ↔ ∃t* Present(t*) ⋀ t<t*)) 
 
For any time t, t will be present just in case t is later than a present time 
(∀t(F(Present(t)) ↔ ∃t* Present(t*) ⋀ t*<t)) 
 
For example, according to BST, <1966 was present> reduces to <1966 is earlier than a 
present time>, and <2066 will be present> reduces to <2066 is later than a present time>.27  
                                               
26 The question of whether the fundamental property of presentness really is temporary given BST is one that I 
return to below.  
27 BST is not merely a straw-man alternative to Cameron’s view: a very similar view is defended by Deasy 
(2015). I discuss Deasy’s view in more detail below.  
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Like MAT, BST implies Temporal Disparity and Anti-tensism.28,29 In that sense, the 
view shares many of the virtues that Cameron claims for MAT. However, Cameron (ibid, 85) 
argues that we should prefer MAT to BST on the grounds that unlike MAT, BST implies that 
nothing ever changes.  
Cameron’s argument for this conclusion is as follows:30 there is a theory – call it the 
Frozen Spotlight Theory (FST) – which implies exactly the same complete fundamental 
description of reality as BST, but according to which it is always the case that this time u is 
present. (For example, suppose that according to FST, the operator ‘Always’ in the sentence 
‘Always, u is present’ is redundant, so that <u is present> is equivalent to <always, u is 
present>.) In other words, FST agrees with BST on all of the fundamental facts, but also 
implies that presentness is ‘frozen’ at this time. But if FST implies that presentness is ‘frozen’ 
at this time then given that (by definition) every property other than presentness is permanent 
according to FST, FST implies that every property is permanent. It follows that FST implies 
Propositional Atemporalism.31 And according to Cameron, in that case we can argue against 
BST as follows: 
 
(1) For any theory T, if there is a theory T* such that (i) the fundamental description 
of the world D according to T = the fundamental description of the world D* 
according to T* and (ii) T* implies Propositional Atemporalism, then T implies that 
nothing ever changes 
 
                                               
28 According to Cameron (in correspondence), given MAT, this time u time is present in virtue of being the 
unique time t such that for all x, x’s age at t is x’s age simpliciter. I assume this metaphysically distinguishes u 
from all other times, so that MAT implies Temporal Disparity.  
29 The idea is that given BST, the only role for the tense operators is to capture change in which time is present; 
therefore, given the above analyses, there are no fundamental tense operators given BST.  
30 This is my own reconstruction of Cameron’s argument.  
31 Where the truth-predicate is interpreted as expressing a monadic property.  
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(2) There is a theory T* – namely, FST – such that (i) the fundamental description of 
the world D according to BST = the fundamental description of the world D* 




(c) BST implies that nothing ever changes 
 
This is Cameron’s argument for preferring MAT to BST. Notice that premise (1) expresses a 
necessary condition for a theory’s being one according to which there is change over time – it 
is equivalent to: 
 
Cameronian Change: For any theory T, T implies that there is change over time only 
if there is no theory T* such that (i) the fundamental description of the world D 
according to T = the fundamental description of the world D* according to T* and (ii) 
T* implies Propositional Atemporalism 
 
This is Cameron’s alternative to Priorian Change. Cameronian Change is importantly 
different to Priorian Change: in particular, a theory can satisfy Priorian Change without 
satisfying Cameronian Change. For example, imagine a theory T on which Propositional 
Temporalism is true, but not fundamentally true; for example, because the tense operators 
(including ‘at t’) have some reductive analysis – a ‘fancy semantics’ as Cameron (ibid, 167) 
memorably puts it. T satisfies Priorian Change, but it may not satisfy Cameronian Change: 
there may be a theory T* which agrees with T as regards the fundamental facts but provides 
an alternative analysis of the tense operators given which Propositional Atemporalism is 
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(non-fundamentally) true. In effect, Cameronian Change adds the following additional 
necessary condition for change to Priorian Change: that Temporalism (in the form of 
Propositional Temporalism) is true given the fundamental facts. According to Cameron, 
MAT satisfies this extra condition, but BST does not.  
But does MAT really satisfy that extra condition? Consider a theory – call it the 
Eternal Ages Theory (EAT) – which implies exactly the same complete fundamental 
description of reality as MAT, but according to which everything always has the age it has 
now. (For example, suppose that according to EAT, the operator ‘Always’ in the sentence 
‘Always, Queen Anne is 354 years old’ is redundant, so that <Queen Anne is 354 years old> 
is equivalent to <always, Queen Anne is 354 years old>.) In other words, EAT agrees with 
MAT on all of the fundamental facts, but also implies that the ages of things are ‘frozen’. But 
if EAT implies that the ages of things are ‘frozen’, then given that (by definition) all 
properties other than age-properties are permanent according to EAT, EAT implies that every 
property is permanent. It follows that EAT implies Propositional Atemporalism. And in that 
case, we can argue against MAT as follows: 
 
(3) For any theory T, if there is a theory T* such that (i) the fundamental description 
of the world D according to T = the fundamental description of the world D* 
according to T* and (ii) T* implies Propositional Atemporalism, then T implies that 
nothing ever changes 
 
(4) There is a theory T* – namely, EAT – such that (i) the fundamental description of 
the world D according to MAT = the fundamental description of the world D* 





(c) MAT implies that nothing ever changes 
 
In other words, it seems that there is an argument exactly analogous to Cameron’s argument 
against BST against his own view.  
How should Cameron respond to this argument? There are two options: either reject 
premise (3) – in other words, reject Cameronian Change – or accept Cameronian Change and 
instead reject premise (4). In what follows I consider both of these options, in reverse order. I 
conclude that the best way for Cameron to respond to the above argument is to reject 
Cameronian Change in favour of Priorian Change.  
One way for Cameron to respond to the above argument is to reject premise (4), on 
the grounds that there is no such Propositional Atemporalist theory as EAT. In particular, 
Cameron could argue that for any theory T, if the complete fundamental description of the 
world D according to T = the complete fundamental description of the world D* according to 
MAT, then T implies Propositional Temporalism. But why believe that? The idea is that it is 
‘of the (metaphysical) essence of’ fundamental age properties – i.e. fundamental properties of 
the form being n units of time old – that they are temporary. For example, here is Cameron 
(ibid, 168; my emphases):32 
 
In saying that things were a certain way, my moving spotlighter is saying something about the very 
nature of things. It is of the essence of things that have such-and-such a temporal distributional 
property and so-and-so an age that they are a certain way now, but it is also of the essence of things 
that have those properties that they were and will be some other way. 
 
                                               
32 See also Cameron (2017).  
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But what exactly does it mean to say that it is of the essence of fundamental age properties 
that they are temporary? According to Cameron, this means that necessarily, if it is a 
fundamental truth that some x is n units of time old, then the existence of the state of affairs 
of x’s being n units of time old, together with the essence of the property being n units of time 
old, makes it true that x was n-1 units of time old.33 It follows that for any theory T, if the 
fundamental description of the world D according to T implies that things possess 
fundamental age properties, T implies Propositional Temporalism; and therefore there is no 
such theory as EAT according to which things possess fundamental age properties and 
Propositional Atemporalism is true. In short, given the kinds of properties that ages are, 
theories such as MAT that posit fundamental ages cannot fail to satisfy Cameronian Change. 
However, there is a problem with this response for Cameron. The problem is that 
Cameron’s rejection of premise (4) is inconsistent with his (ibid, 127) claim that MAT 
‘avoids having to take any tensed fact as fundamental’. To see this, remember that according 
to Cameron, to hold that fundamental age properties are ‘essentially temporary’ is to commit 
to the following claim – call it Essential Temporality: 
 
Essential Temporality: If it is a fundamental truth that some x is n units of time old, 
then the existence of the state of affairs of x’s being n units of time old, together with 
the essence of the property being n units of time old, makes it true that x was n-1 units 
of time old 
 
Now we can ask: given MAT, is Essential Temporality itself a fundamental truth? Cameron 
may respond that it is not, because it is made true by its instances. But in that case, take any 
instance of Essential Temporality – for example, <the existence of the state of affairs of my 
                                               
33 Cameron (in correspondence).  
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being n years old together with the essence of the property being n years old makes it true 
that I was n-1 years old>. Call that proposition P. We can then ask whether P is a 
fundamental truth given MAT. It seems Cameron must answer that it is: it is hard to see what 
could be said about what makes P true. But notice that P involves the tense operator ‘It was 
the case that’ (‘I was n-1 years old’). In that case, it follows that given MAT, there are 
fundamental ‘tensed’ truths, and therefore it is not the case that MAT ‘avoids having to take 
any tensed fact as fundamental’. But that would be a serious problem for Cameron, as he 
takes it to be one of the significant virtues of MAT that it implies Anti-tensism.  
I have described one potential response on Cameron’s behalf to the argument that 
MAT implies that nothing ever changes, namely, to reject premise (4) of that argument. 
However, we have seen that that strategy is inconsistent with Cameron’s rejection of 
fundamental tense. I suggest that a better way for Cameron to respond to the argument is to 
reject premise (3) – i.e. Cameronian Change – in favour of the view that for any theory T, T 
implies that there is change over time only if T implies Propositional Temporalism – i.e. in 
favour of Priorian Change. In that case, Cameron can allow that there is a Propositional 
Atemporalist theory T – namely, EAT – such that the fundamental description of the world D 
according to MAT = the fundamental description of the world D* according to T, but deny 
that it follows that given MAT, nothing ever changes. Rather, Cameron can argue that given 
that MAT implies the (non-fundamental) truth of Propositional Temporalism, there is no 
obvious threat to the claim that his view is one according to which there is change over time. 
But does MAT secure the truth of Propositional Temporalism? According to Cameron 
(in correspondence), given MAT, Propositional Temporalism is made true by any of its 
instances. For example, let ‘P’ name the truth that sometimes I am sitting and sometimes I am 
not sitting. According to Cameron, the truth that for some proposition p, sometimes p is true 
and sometimes p is not true (i.e. Propositional Temporalism) is made true by the existence of 
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the state of affairs of P’s being true; and P in turn is made true by my having a certain 
temporary age and permanent temporal distributional property.  
Of course, there is a cost to this response for Cameron: as we saw above, Cameronian 
Change is a premise in Cameron’s argument against BST, which he takes to be a rival to his 
own view. The question, then, is whether Cameron use Priorian Change to argue against 
BST. 
In order to address this question, let us consider Deasy’s (2015) version of MST. Like 
BST, Deasy’s MST combines Temporal Disparity (in the form of the view that presentness is 
the one and only temporary fundamental property) with Anti-tensism. Moreover, like BST, 
Deasy’s MST implies that the only role for the tense operators is in describing change in 
which time possesses fundamental presentness. However, according to Deasy (ibid, 2078-9), 
MSTers should also accept that ‘ordinary’ predicates express temporary properties of bearing 
certain permanent relations to a present time, so that e.g. the predicate ‘is sitting’ expresses 
the temporary (monadic) property of sitting-at a present time.34 Let us call this view About 
Presentness: 
 
About Presentness: For each property F expressed by an ordinary predicate, there is a 
permanent relation R such that F is the temporary property of bearing R to a present 
time 
 
In addition to About Presentness, Deasy (ibid, 2080) accepts the standard ‘quantificational’ 
analyses of the tense operators ‘P’ and ‘F’ in terms of quantification over times and ‘at (time) 
t’:  
                                               
34 Sider (2017, 790, n.2) also recommends this view to MSTers. 
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It was the case that 𝜑 just in case there is a time earlier than a present time at which it 
is the case that 𝜑 
(P𝜑 ↔ ∃t∃t1(Present(t) ⋀ t1<t ⋀ at t1(𝜑))) 
 
It will be the case that 𝜑 just in case there is a time later than a present time at which 
it is the case that 𝜑 
(F𝜑 ↔ ∃t∃t1(Present(t) ⋀ t<t1 ⋀ at t1(𝜑))) 
 
Finally, Deasy (ibid, 2081-2) defends the following ‘substitutional analysis’ of the tense 
operator ‘at t’: 
 
The Substitutional Analysis: For it to be the case that at t(𝜑) (where 𝜑 is a sentence 
free from tense operators and ‘at t’, and in which the only formulae that attribute 
temporary properties are formulae of the form ‘x is present’) is for it to be the case 
that 𝜑[=t/present]35 
 
To see how Deasy’s analysis works in practice, consider the sentence ‘P(∃xDodo(x))’ (‘It was 
the case that something is a dodo’). Given About Presentness and the quantificational 
analysis of ‘P’, this sentence reduces to: 
 
(5) There is a time earlier than a present time at which something is a dodo-at a 
present time 
                                               
35 Although Deasy refers to this as an ‘analysis’ of ‘at t’, it looks more like a way of systematically translating 
sentences involving ‘at t’ into sentences of the tense operator-free fundamental language of MST. However, not 
much of importance rests on this point, so I will continue to refer to it as an ‘analysis’.  
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(∃t∃t1(Present(t) ⋀ t1<t ⋀ at t1(∃x∃t2 D(x, t2) ⋀ Present(t2)))) 
 
Given the Substitutional Analysis, (5) reduces to: 
 
(6) There is a time t earlier than a present time such that something is a dodo-at t 
(∃t∃t1(Present(t) ⋀ t1<t ⋀ ∃t2 t1=t2 ⋀ ∃x D(x, t2))) 
 
Similarly, consider the sentence:  
 
(7) Sometimes, something is sometimes present and sometimes not present  
(S∃x(SPresent(x) ⋀ S¬Present(x))) 
 
Given the quantificational analyses of ‘P’ and ‘F’ and the standard definition of ‘S’ in terms 
of ‘P’ and ‘F’ (S𝜑 =def P𝜑 ⋁ 𝜑 ⋁ F𝜑), (7) reduces to: 
 
(8) At some time t, something is such that there is a time at which it is present and a 
time at which it is not present 
(∃t(at t(∃x∃t1 at t1(Present(x)) ⋀ ∃t2 at t(¬Present(x))))) 
 
Given the Substitutional Analysis, (8) reduces to: 
 
(9) There are at least two times  
(∃x(∃t x=t ⋀ ∃t* ¬x=t*)) 
 
In short, given Deasy’s Substitutional Analysis, presentness is temporary just in case there 
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are at least two times, which is of course true given MST. It follows that the combination of 
the Substitutional Analysis with MST secures the temporariness of presentness – at least, in 
the sense of securing the truth of (7). But does it secure the truth of Temporalism?  
 First, consider Sentential Temporalism. Given the quantificational analyses of ‘P’ and 
‘F’ and the standard definition of ‘S’ in terms of ‘P’ and ‘F’, Sentential Temporalism reduces 
to: 
 
(10) There is a p such that for some time t, at t, p and for some time t, at t, not-p 
(∃p(∃t at t(p) ⋀ ∃t at t(¬p))) 
 
But given that there are no instances of the predicate ‘is present’ in the scope of the instances 
of ‘at t’ in (10) (there is only the irreducibly higher-order variable ‘p’), given the 
Substitutional Analysis the instances of ‘at t’ in (10) are redundant. But if the instances of ‘at 
t’ in (10) are redundant then (10) is equivalent to the higher-order logical falsehood ‘There is 
a p such that p and not-p’ (‘∃p(p ⋀	¬p’)). Therefore (10) – i.e. Sentential Temporalism – is 
false given Deasy’s MST.  
 What about Propositional Temporalism? Given the quantificational analyses of ‘P’ 
and ‘F’ and the standard definition of ‘S’ in terms of ‘P’ and ‘F’, Propositional Temporalism 
reduces to: 
 
(11) For some x, x is a proposition and at some time t, x is true, and at some time t, x 
is false  
(∃x(Proposition(x) ⋀ ∃t at t(True(x)) ⋀ ∃t at t(¬True(x)))) 
 
Now the question for Deasy is whether the predicate ‘is true’ in (11) counts as an ‘ordinary 
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predicate’. If not, then given the Substitutional Analysis, the instances of ‘at t’ in (11) are 
again redundant, and (11) is equivalent to the logical falsehood that some proposition is both 
true and false, in which case Deasy’s MST implies the falsehood of Propositional 
Temporalism. On the other hand, if the predicate ‘is true’ in (11) counts as an ‘ordinary 
predicate’ then given About Presentness and the Substitutional Analysis, (11) is equivalent 
to: 
 
(12) For some x, x is a proposition and there is a time t such that x is true-at t, and a 
time t such that x is not true-at t 
(∃x(Proposition(x) ⋀ ∃t True(x, t) ⋀ ∃t ¬True(x, t))) 
 
But notice that (12) is exactly the B-theoretic interpretation of Propositional Temporalism 
described in §2 above, according to which a proposition is ‘temporary’ just in case it bears 
the permanent true-at relation to some but not all times. Therefore, given the Priorian view 
defended there that Propositional Temporalism must be interpreted as involving monadic 
truth, Deasy’s MST counts as a view on which Propositional Temporalism is false, and hence 
(given Priorian Change) as a view on which nothing ever changes. It follows that if Deasy’s 
view is representative of BST, given an acceptance of Priorian Change, Cameron is in a 
position to argue that BST is (unlike MAT) a ‘frozen spotlight theory’.  
 
4. Conclusion 
To summarise: it is difficult to provide arguments in favour of Priorianism that do not incur 
the charge of ‘begging the question’ against those who reject the view. However, that does 
not mean that it is not possible to defend the view. In this paper, I have attempted to defend 
Priorianism by doing three things: first, by making clear exactly what the view is (§1); 
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second, by showing how Priorians can respond to the argument that the B-theory is just as 
‘dynamic’ as Priorianism (§2); and finally, by arguing that Cameron (2015) has good reasons 
to accept Priorian Change – and therefore to accept Priorianism – rather than his own 
alternative principle of change, which I called (for want of a better name) ‘Cameronian 
Change’ (§3).36  
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